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Note
Knowledge Is Power: How Implementing
Affirmative Disclosures Under the JOBS Act
Could Promote and Protect Benefit Corporations
and Their Investors
Laura A. Farley*
“Build the best product, cause no unnecessary harm, use
business to inspire and implement solutions to the environmen1
tal crisis.” This is the mission statement of Patagonia, a California-based company that has gained international popularity
and become one of the most successful outdoor clothing brands
2
in the United States. Nevertheless, the company’s sociallyminded mission seems to be at odds with the traditional notion
of a corporation: how can a company pursue mission-based
goals and maximize profits? In the past, mission-based businesses faced the challenge of conforming to existing for-profit or
3
non-profit business entities. Entity choice greatly impacts a
business’s future and affects the management, operations, lia4
bilities, and taxation of the entity. Because of these inadequate
and polarized options, socially-minded businesses were tradi* J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2010,
University of St. Thomas. The author would like to extend her sincere gratitude to the editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their hard work,
Professor Brett McDonnell for his assistance throughout the writing process,
and to her family and friends for their unending support and humor. Copyright © 2015 by Laura A. Farley.
1. Our Reason for Being, PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.com/us/
patagonia.go?assetid=2047 (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
2. Id.
3. WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR., DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP, ET AL., THE
NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL
FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS,
INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC 1–2 (2011), available at http://
benefitcorp.net/storage/Benefit_Corp_vs_Other_Alternatives.pdf.
4. See generally Matteo Tonello, The Business Case for Corporate Social
Responsibility, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG., (June 26,
2011, 11:46 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/06/26/the-business
-case-for-corporate-social-responsibility.
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tionally limited—for-profit entities focused on maximization of
shareholder profits, while non-profit entities prohibited an or5
ganization from providing a private benefit. Moreover, consumers and investors have demonstrated demand for sociallyminded companies and have reflected changes in corporate expectations. This has shifted much of the business community
toward social responsibility and sustainability.
Fortunately, companies like Patagonia have a new business entity option that accommodates both for-profit and non6
profit goals: the benefit corporation. A benefit corporation is a
business entity that allows companies to consider external, social benefits in addition to the traditional corporate obligation
7
to maximize shareholder profits. These benefits can be very
broad, and may include anything from concern for the envi8
ronment to education reform. Benefit corporations focus on a
broader range of stakeholders, and provide businesses with
greater operational flexibility to pursue strategies that promote
a social benefit instead of an exclusive focus on profit maximi9
zation. While benefit corporation entity structures are available to existing companies, legislation has primarily targeted
10
small startup businesses. Numerous companies have utilized
5. See generally Josh Patrick, Assessing the Benefits of Becoming a Benefit Corporation, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://boss.blogs
.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/assessing-the-benefits-of-a-benefit-corporation;
Stephanie Strom, A Quest for Hybrid Companies That Profit, but Can Tap
Charity, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/
13/business/a-quest-for-hybrid-companies-part-money-maker-part
-nonprofit.html (explaining the dynamic between non-profit, for-profit, and
hybrid entities, such as Benefit Corporations).
6. Brian Cyr & Jessica Lubar, For Good and For Profit: The Emergence
of the Maryland Benefit Corporation, ROSENBERG MARTIN GREENBERG LLP
(June 2010), http://www.rosenbergmartin.com/our-passion/documents/Lubar
ArticleJune2010.pdf.
7. Id.
8. Each state statute defines what may be considered a “benefit” for purposes of the benefit corporation. See infra I.B.1 for a discussion of general and
public benefits. For an example of a benefit corporation, see METHOD,
http://methodhome.com/about-us (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). Method Products
is an established home cleaning products company that has institutionalized
their commitment to environmental sustainability through incorporation as a
benefit corporation.
9. B Corps: Firms with Benefits, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 7, 2012), http://
www.economist.com/node/21542432; see also Jack Rodolico, Benefit Corporations Look Beyond The Profit Motive, NPR (June 18, 2014), http://www
.npr.org/2014/06/18/316349988/benefit-corporations-look-beyond
-the-profit-motive.
10. Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 596 (2011).
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this new entity structure to meet the demands of an increasing11
ly socially-minded market. Despite their popularity, however,
it can be difficult for benefit corporations to obtain funding because the entity is often perceived as relatively risky as an un12
tested business model with unknown returns.
Despite the recent popularity of small and sociallyconscious businesses, the competitive nature and high entry
barriers of capital markets has led to difficulty acquiring sufficient funding for many small companies, including benefit cor13
porations. Furthermore, due to the unique structure of the
benefit corporation, such companies face additional challenges
14
securing investors and maintaining funding.
In 2012, in an attempt to address the funding issues all
small businesses face, Congress passed the Jumpstart Our
15
Business Startups Act (the JOBS Act, or the Act). The goal of
the Act is to “increase American job creation and economic
growth by improving access to the public capital markets for
16
emerging growth companies.” The JOBS Act seeks to increase
funding and growth through flexible rules and funding platforms for small businesses, which allows investor solicitation
and “crowdfunding” for small businesses (collectively referred
17
to as “JOBS Act funding platforms”). Essentially, the Act re-

11. Cara Griffith, Benefit Corporations: The Corporate Entity Of The Future?, FORBES (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2014/
10/30/benefit-corporations-the-corporate-entity-of-the-future.
12. Laws Provide Con Artists with Personal Economic Growth Plan, N.
AM. SEC. ADMINS. ASS’N (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.nasaa.org/14679/laws
-provide-con-artists-with-personal-economic-growth-plan.
13. David Skok, Why Startups Fail, FOR ENTREPRENEURS, http://www
.forentrepreneurs.com/business-models/why-startups-fail (last visited Mar. 9,
2015).
14. See Briana Cummings, Benefit Corporations: How To Enforce a Mandate To Promote the Public Interest, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 578, 588 (2012)
(“Double bottom line corporations [like Benefit Corporations] struggle to raise
capital because they do not fit the settled categories and expectations of existing sources of capital.”); see also Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on
the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 352 (2009) (“In a recent
study of the emerging fourth sector, social entrepreneurs reported that their
most pressing challenge was gaining access to investment capital.”).
15. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106,
126 Stat. 306 (2012).
16. Id.
17. Id.

FARLEY_4fmt

1510

4/10/2015 12:17 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:1507

duces entry barriers that small businesses face as they try to
18
obtain funding in capital markets.
The JOBS Act is focused on promoting small businesses
and, accordingly, will greatly impact benefit corporations, many
of which are small businesses. Still, because the Act focuses on
all small businesses, it does not adequately protect benefit corporation investors. Specifically, the Act lacks important affirmative disclosures to inform, and thus protect, benefit corporation investors. Potential investors could be at a serious risk if
they unknowingly invest in a benefit corporation believing it to
be a traditional corporation with a profit-only focus. The omission of such protection in the Act has the potential to create serious issues for those investing in benefit corporations and
could ultimately hinder the future of benefit corporations.
This Note argues that affirmative disclosures would be advantageous to both benefit corporations and their investors under the JOBS Act’s funding platforms, and would ultimately
promote investor protection and the national progression of the
benefit corporation. Part I of this Note outlines the emergence
of the benefit corporation, the foundation of state benefit corporation legislation, and the JOBS Act. Part II analyzes a primary issue currently facing benefit corporations: the ability to attain sufficient funding. Part II then evaluates how the JOBS
Act solves many funding issues for small businesses, but creates new, complex issues that undermine the protection of benefit corporation investors. Finally, Part III argues that the best
way to resolve the issues created by the JOBS Act is to amend
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations under
the JOBS Act and impose affirmative disclosure requirements
for benefit corporations choosing to participate in JOBS Act
funding options. Affirmative disclosures for benefit corporations would act as a preventative safeguard to ensure investor
protection. Such regulatory measures would positively change
the landscape of benefit corporations and are crucial to secure a
successful future for benefit corporations as they utilize these
new funding platforms and continue to grow in success and
popularity.

18. See id. See generally Chris Brummer & Daniel Gorfine, The JOBS Act
Isn’t All ‘Crowdfunding,’ FORBES (Oct. 8, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/realspin/2013/10/08/the-jobs-act-isnt-all-crowdfunding (explaining
the fundamental aspects of the JOBS Act).
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I. STATE AND FEDERAL REACTIONS TO THE SHIFT IN
CORPORATE EXPECTATIONS: THE EMERGENCE AND
FOUNDATIONS OF BENEFIT CORPORATIONS AND THE
JOBS ACT LEGISLATION
Over the past decade, corporate expectations have shifted,
driving the business community towards small business, social
responsibility, and sustainability. One response to this shift
has been the creation and popularity of the benefit corpora19
tion. Notwithstanding their popularity, benefit corporations
have had difficulty obtaining financial success due to their new
and untested structure. Moreover, benefit corporations face the
same issues raising funds as a traditional small business, financial challenges which have intensified over recent years due
20
to national economic instability. To address the economic challenges of small businesses, Congress enacted the JOBS Act,
thereby helping many benefit corporations. The Act creates
new funding platforms for small businesses: equity
21
crowdfunding and investor solicitation. This Section details
both state benefit corporation legislation and the JOBS Act.
Part A explains the foundations of benefit corporations as an
entity. Part B expands on these foundations, and discusses the
specifics of benefit corporation legislation and the differences
between traditional and benefit corporations. Part C explains
the current challenges facing benefit corporations. Finally, Part
D discusses the JOBS Act and its potential to solve these issues.
A. THE EMERGENCE OF THE BENEFIT CORPORATION
Corporate structures that combined a for-profit structure
22
with non-profit values began emerging in the early 2000s.
These entities materialized to meet the needs of entrepreneurs
interested in building a company focused on both profit- and
23
mission-oriented goals. Such entities continue to grow due to

19. See Reiser, supra note 10, at 606.
20. See Kelley, supra note 14, at 352.
21. See id.
22. See Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment by Proxy or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243, 246–47 (2010) (detailing the first legally recognized hybrid entity, the Low-Profit Limited Liability
Company, a legal entity that merges charitable or educational goals with the
LLC structure).
23. See Reiser, supra note 10, at 606; Patrick, supra note 5.
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increased demand from consumers and investors. Though var25
ious types of hybrid entities exist, the benefit corporation has
proven the most effectual and successful because its foundations are based in corporate law, with which entrepreneurs and
26
investors have a greater understanding and familiarity.
In 2010, Maryland became the first state to enact legisla27
tion adopting the benefit corporation. Since Maryland’s enactment, twenty-five additional states have adopted some type
28
of benefit corporation legislation, while others continue to in29
troduce such legislation. Delaware, the predominant state for
corporate law, has also adopted benefit corporation legislation,
solidifying the importance and potential of this emerging business entity.
B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRADITIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
Generally, a benefit corporation is a business entity that
allows companies to consider external social obligations in addition to the general corporate expectation of profit maximiza30
tion and shareholder value. While there are some differences
among states’ benefit corporation legislation, among the many
states, benefit corporations are similarly defined and adhere to

24. Strom, supra note 5.
25. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 22, at 246–47.
26. See Kelley, supra note 14, at 350–54; Reiser, supra note 10, at 594,
601–03. B Lab, a non-profit that promotes benefit corporations, headed this
progress, implementing non-legal certifications and commercialization to initiate the early popularity of benefit corporations. Powered by B Lab, BENEFIT
CORP INFO. CTR, http://benefitcorp.net/about-b-lab (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
B Lab has been pivotal in the creation and visibility of benefit corporations,
especially in efforts creating the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, which
has served as the foundation for state efforts in benefit corporation legislation.
See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION §§ 102, 201(a) (2013), available at
http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Model_Benefit_Corporation_
Legislation.pdf.
27. Cyr & Lubar, supra note 6.
28. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, D.C., and West
Virginia have all enacted legislation. See State by State Legislative Status,
BENEFIT CORP, http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status
(last visited Mar. 9, 2015). Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, New Mexico, North
Dakota, and Oklahoma have introduced legislation. See id.
29. See id.
30. Id.
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31

the same fundamental requirements. There are three primary
characteristics that differentiate benefit corporations from traditional corporations: corporate purpose; mandated director
and officer accountability; and transparency requirements.
1. Corporate Purpose
32

A traditional corporation can have any legal purpose. Accompanying this flexible idea, however, is the general expectation that the goal of a corporation is to maximize profits and
33
shareholder value. Though the scope of this concept has been
34
the topic of much debate and litigation, it is generally understood that a corporation “is organized and carried on primarily
35
for the profit of the stockholders.”
Benefit corporations deviate from this traditional purpose.
While pursuing profits, benefit corporations also have the “pur36
pose of creating general public benefit.” This expands the traditional corporate goals to include the promotion of general or
specific public benefits. A general public benefit is defined as a
“material positive impact on society and the environment . . .

31. See generally JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, The Evolution of
Corporations in England and America, 1 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 2:14 (3d ed. 2012 & Supp. 2014).
32. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.101 (1981) (“A corporation may be incorporated under this chapter for any business purpose or purposes, unless some
other statute of this state requires incorporation for any of those purposes under a different law. Unless otherwise provided in its articles, a corporation has
general business purposes.”).
33. Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a
New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 1001–03
(2009).
34. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 735–38 (2005).
35. Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see also Katz v. Oak
Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986); Long v. Norwood Hills Corp.,
380 S.W.2d 451, 475–479 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Granada Inv., Inc. v. DWG
Corp., 823 F. Supp. 448, 459 (N.D. Ohio 1993). Compare Sneirson, supra note
33, at 1001–06 (recognizing a duty to shareholders but arguing the businessjudgment rule renders this duty meaningless), with Jonathan R. Macey, A
Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 177, 179 (2008) (arguing that duties to shareholders remain paramount,
even in the face of deference to corporate managers), and STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS §§ 1.4(B), 9.2, 9.3 (2002).
36. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 201(a) (2013); see also CAL.
CORP. CODE § 14601(a) (West 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-2 (West 2014);
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01(c) (LexisNexis 2014); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:18-1 (West 2014); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1702 (McKinney 2003);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(1) (2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2011).
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from the business and operations of a benefit corporation.”
Some states allow benefit corporations to adopt specific public
benefits in addition to general public benefits, including:
(1) providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities
with beneficial products or services; (2) promoting economic opportunity for individuals or communities beyond the creation of jobs in
the normal course of business; (3) protecting or restoring the environment; (4) improving human health; (5) promoting the arts, sciences or advancement of knowledge; (6) increasing the flow of capital to
entities with a purpose to benefit society or the environment; and (7)
conferring any other particular benefit on society or the environ38
ment.
39

A general public benefit is required. Specific public benefits, such as a societal or environmental benefit, are not manda40
tory. The difference between the goals of a traditional corporation versus a benefit corporation is important because those
goals drive the operation, strategic direction, and obligations of
41
company management.
2. Management Accountability
Typically, officers and directors must act in accordance
42
with the purpose and goals of a corporation. As discussed, the
general purpose of a traditional corporation is to maximize
43
profits and shareholder value. Consequently, directors must
generally work to achieve those ends. In so doing, directors owe
a fiduciary duty of loyalty and care to the corporation, and,
44
thereby, to the shareholders. The duty of loyalty requires di37. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102; see also CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 14601(c); HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-2; MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 56C-01(c); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1; N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1702(b); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(4); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782.
38. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102; CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 14601(e); HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-5(b); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS
§ 5-6C-01(d); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1; N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1702(e); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(6); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782.
39. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102.
40. See id.
41. See generally Rodolico, supra note 9.
42. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That
For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 148–55
(2012). But see Lyman Johnson, Emerging Issues In Social Enterprise: Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L.
REV. 269, 273 (2012).
43. See infra Part I.B.1.
44. Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 457–60 (2009) (“A director’s fiduciary duty of loyalty
has long been a core feature of corporate jurisprudence.”).
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rectors to pursue the best interests of the corporation and
45
shareholders above their own interests. The duty of care requires that directors exercise good “business judgment” and use
46
ordinary care in operating the business.
Nevertheless, there is a division in traditional corporate
statutes among states. Some states permit officers and directors of traditional corporations to consider other constituencies,
stakeholders other than the company’s shareholders, in their
business judgment. For example, Minnesota’s corporate statute
provides that the Board of Directors “may . . . consider the interests of the corporation’s employees, customers, suppliers,
and creditors, the economy of the state and nation, community
and societal considerations, and the long-term as well as short47
term interests of the corporation and its shareholders . . . .” In
contrast, other states, including Delaware, do not expressly
permit corporations to consider such non-shareholder constitu48
encies. The difference between these so-called constituency
statutes and non-constituency statutes presents an important
difference in corporate common law among the states. The expectation of benefit corporations, however, is distinct from both
constituency and non-constituency corporate statutes. While
traditional corporate constituency statutes permit the consideration of other constituents aside from the corporation and its
shareholders, benefit corporations require the consideration of
49
a company’s purported benefits. Accordingly, the management
of benefit corporations has different fiduciary duties than the
management of traditional corporations.
Benefit corporation legislation mandates heightened accountability requirements for management, which expands the
fiduciary duties of officers and directors so that they are re45. Id.
46. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 525 (1984) (explaining that the business judgment rule is the standard, though declining to
apply it in this case); In re Farmland Indus., Inc., 294 B.R. 855, 881 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 2003) (“Under the ‘business judgment’ rule, the management of a
corporation’s affairs is placed in the hands of its board of directors and officers,
and the Court should interfere with their decisions only if it is made clear that
those decisions are, inter alia, clearly erroneous, made arbitrarily, are in
breach of the officers’ and directors’ fiduciary duty to the corporation, [or] are
made on the basis of inadequate information or study.”).
47. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251 subdiv. 5 (2014).
48. See Johnson, supra note 42, at 272.
49. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier For Directors To “Do The
Right Thing?”, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 238 (2014). See also Johnson, supra
note 42, at 289.
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quired to consider the mission-based goals of the benefit corpo50
ration. The directors and officers of benefit corporations still
owe the duties of loyalty and care, but benefit corporation legislation modifies this notion to include a broader range of stakeholders and stronger levels of accountability from directors and
51
officers. In addition to traditional fiduciary duties, benefit
corporation legislation mandates that directors and officers act
to support benefit corporations’ purported benefits. Specifically,
management must consider shareholders, employees, the “interests of customers as beneficiaries,” “community and societal
factors,” the environment, and any other appropriate cause or
52
group as designated by the articles or bylaws of a corporation.
53
These considerations extend to directors and officers. No single consideration must be prioritized against another unless
the benefit corporation’s articles of incorporation explicitly pro54
vide. The different accountability requirements in benefit corporation legislation establish a fundamental difference from
regular corporations, drawing a distinction from corporate
common law, which mandates that directors “maximize the fi55
nancial value of a corporation.” These requirements also establish that directors and officers of benefit corporations will be
held accountable for their efforts in furtherance of a benefit
56
corporation’s mission-based purposes.
To substantiate these duties, many states have created a
57
“benefit enforcement proceeding.” This proceeding creates a
cause of action for specified shareholders, the corporation, or
directors, if the benefit corporation fails to “pursue or create
general public benefit or a specific public benefit purpose set
forth in its articles,” or “violat[es] any obligation, duty, or
58
standard of conduct under” the statute. The benefit enforce50. See, e.g., MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102 (2013).
51. Id.; see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(c) (West 2014); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 420D-2 (West 2014); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01(c) (LexisNexis 2014).
52. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(a).
53. Id. § 303(a).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 301 cmt.; see also Reiser, supra note 10, at 595.
56. See Reiser, supra note 10, at 595.
57. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION §§ 102, 301, 305 (citing Dodge v.
Ford, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,
16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010)). A benefit proceeding does not necessarily preclude
standard litigation, though. Because this is untested, it is yet to be seen how
this type of proceeding will work.
58. Id.
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ment proceeding further establishes that the directors and officers of a benefit corporation have a duty to act in accordance
with the purported benefit, and will be held accountable for
59
their pursuit of the benefits.
3. Operational Transparency
Unlike traditional corporations, benefit corporations must
maintain a certain level of transparency in order to ensure that
they are acting in accordance with purported general and spe60
cific public benefits. Transparency requirements focus on the
preparation of an annual benefit report, which must detail the
“ways in which the benefit corporation pursued general public
benefit during the year and the extent to which general public
61
benefit was created.” The report is currently used for the benefit of existing shareholders. If one is adopted, the report is ex62
panded to include the specific public benefit. The annual benefit report must also include any difficulties that have hindered
63
the corporation’s ability to create these benefits. Furthermore,
the benefit corporation is tasked with assessing the “overall social and environmental performance of the benefit corporation
64
against a third-party standard.” Finally, the annual benefit
report must be displayed on the company’s website, if they have
65
one. Such reporting requirements are not present in traditional corporate legislation and are a unique way to maintain
and monitor the operation of a benefit corporation.
Though the benefit corporation is different from a traditional corporation, this new business model has proven success66
ful as an independent entity. Nevertheless, while benefit corporations have drawn substantial attention from entrepreneurs
59. See Cummings, supra note 14, at 593.
60. Id.
61. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 401(a)(1)(i); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 14630 (West 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-11 (West 2014); MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-08 (LexisNexis 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11
(West 2014); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1708 (McKinney 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
11A, § 21.14 (2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791 (2011).
62. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 401(a)(1).
63. Id. § 401(a)(1)(iii).
64. Id. § 401(a)(2). See Reiser, supra note 10, at 611 ( “All of the statutes
envision public benefit assessments in annual benefit reports . . . with reference to the third-party standard. But, none of the statutes specify whether or
how standard-setters should be involved in vetting public-benefit provision
after incorporation.”).
65. Reiser, supra note 10, at 604.
66. See Strom, supra note 5.
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and investors, they face the same challenges as a traditional
startup and a number of financial challenges unique to the
benefit corporation entity.
C. FINANCIAL ISSUES FACING BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
To date, the primary issue facing benefit corporations has
67
been raising enough money to fund operations. Despite their
popularity with business owners, benefit corporations have ex68
perienced difficulty gaining traction with investors. Benefit
corporations are often less attractive than other options because they lack the firm, traditional incentives to invest, such
as an anticipated return on investment. The pecuniary return
on investing in a benefit corporation is not yet clear. It can be
difficult for benefit corporations to obtain funding because the
entity, an untested business model, can be perceived as rela69
tively risky. While investors and entrepreneurs have shown
interest in the benefit corporation, expectations regarding the
70
return on investment in a benefit corporation are unknown.
Accordingly, investors are generally drawn towards a traditional corporate model, which offers a higher return on investment, or a non-profit model, which offers full dedication to pub71
lic benefits and provides tax incentives for contributions.
The general unfamiliarity with benefit corporations has
72
exacerbated funding issues. There is not yet precedent with
which to evaluate issues arising from benefit corporations;
there has not been litigation regarding a benefit corporation’s
shareholder rights, nor has there been a benefit enforcement

67. See Cummings, supra note 14, at 588.
68. See Strine, supra note 49, at 251 (“But another crucial question for the
benefit corporation to answer affirmatively is whether benefit corporations can
generate results for equity investors that inspire confidence that companies
doing it the right way will generate long-run returns consistent with prudent
portfolio growth.”).
69. See id.; see also Reiser, supra note 10, at 618–21 (explaining the difficulties that face small companies, especially benefit corporations, in obtaining
funding).
70. See generally Resier, supra note 10.
71. Emily Chan, The Profitable Side of Nonprofits—Part II: Different Legal Structures, NONPROFIT L. BLOG (May 13, 2011), http://www
.nonprofitlawblog.com/the-profitable-side-of-nonprofits-part-ii-different-legal
-structures.
72. See generally Reiser, supra note 10, at 618–21 (explaining the difficulties that face small companies, especially benefit corporations, in obtaining
funding).
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73

proceeding. In effect, there is no clear foundation as to how a
benefit corporation will operate and be held accountable if they
do not achieve purported benefits or act in accordance with accountability requirements. The repercussions are unclear, and
it is unknown what rights shareholders will have to enforce
compliance with either the profit- or mission-based expecta74
tions. Though a popular platform for entrepreneurs, the benefit corporation’s newness can deter investors.
Moreover, because benefit corporations are often small or
startup businesses, they face the same general difficulties obtaining and maintaining funding. Small businesses have difficulty obtaining funding due to the overly burdensome requirements to enter securities markets, which allow companies to
75
gain capital. Additionally, as small businesses, it is difficult to
effectively advertise and access investors. Congress has recently addressed funding issues facing all small businesses, which
will also improve the situation for many benefit corporations.
D. THE JOBS ACT PROVIDES A POWERFUL SOLUTION FOR
FUNDING SMALL BUSINESSES
76

The JOBS Act was enacted on April 5, 2012. The purpose
of the act is to “increase American job creation and economic
growth by improving access to the public capital markets for
77
emerging growth companies.” This is done primarily through
two new funding platforms for small businesses: equity
crowdfunding and investor solicitation. As Part 1 details, the
Act “establishes the foundation for a regulatory structure for
startups and small businesses to raise capital through securi78
ties offerings using the Internet through crowdfunding.” Part
73. Strine, supra note 49, at 251; Doug Bend & Alex King, Why Consider a
Benefit Corporation?, FORBES (May 30, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/theyec/2014/05/30/why-consider-a-benefit-corporation.
74. Reiser, supra note 10, at 612 (“The statutes impose no clear framework for directorial decision making. Without one, it is difficult to identify a
metric by which shareholders might enforce fiduciaries’ compliance with dual
mission.”).
75. Joan MacLeod Heminway, To Be or Not To Be (a Security): Funding
for For-Profit Social Enterprises, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 299, 319 (2013) (“The
costs associated with producing these filings are significant and may be slightly higher for social enterprise issuers . . . .”).
76. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106,
126 Stat. 306, 307–08 (2012).
77. Id.
78. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,429 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249).
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2 discusses the new allowance for investor solicitation under
79
the Act. These provisions were initiated to provide small businesses with an opportunity to reach investors and earn capital
without entering the often costly and burdensome securities
80
market.
1. The JOBS Act Establishes a Platform for Equity
“Crowdfunding”
The JOBS Act improves funding for small businesses
through the creation of a regulatory platform for equity
crowdfunding. Put simply, crowdfunding raises money from a
large amount of people investing small individual contribu81
tions. Currently, there are a number of websites that facilitate
82
crowdfunding. Nevertheless, the current form of crowdfunding
cannot offer investors any share in the financial returns of the
83
company, because selling shares or interest in the profit of a
84
company equates to selling securities. Selling securities or security-like products requires federal registration and is highly

79. Fact Sheet: Eliminating the Prohibition on General Solicitation and
General Advertising in Certain Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 10,
2013), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-124-item1.htm.
80. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,429. See Dave Michaels,
Crowdfunding for Internet Stock Sales Approved by SEC, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
23, 2013, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-23/sec
-to-vote-on-crowdfunding-plan-as-white-advances-jobs-act-1-.
81. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,429. See also Brummer & Gorfine,
supra note 18 (defining crowdfunding as “the process by which capital is
raised for a project, venture, or enterprise through the pooling of numerous
and relatively small financial contributions or investments from the public,
usually via the internet”).
82. Examples of current crowdfunding websites include http://www
.kickstarter.com, http://www.peerbackers.com, and http://www.indiegogo.com.
Although these websites offer funding options, they do not “offer securities,
such as an ownership interest or share of profits in a business; rather, money
was contributed in the form of donations, or in return for the product being
made. The JOBS Act creates an exemption from the registration requirements
of the Securities Act that provides for a form of securities crowdfunding.”
Small Business and the SEC, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (October 10, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm#capital.
83. Currently, small businesses can raise capital through “borrowing
money from banks, other financial institutions or friends/family and by selling
securities,” but if the company “offer[s] and sell[s] securities, even if to just one
person, the offer and sale of the securities must either be registered with the
SEC or conducted in accordance with one of the many registration exemptions
. . . [this] would make your company a public company. Going public is a very
significant step for any company.” Id.
84. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,429.
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regulated under the Securities Act of 1933. Such regulation
would trigger ongoing reporting to the SEC under the Securi86
ties Exchange Act of 1934. These regulations and reporting
requirements are costly and time-consuming, which prevents
87
many small businesses from selling securities.
In response, the SEC has proposed rules under Title III of
the JOBS Act (Title III) to facilitate crowdfunding as a legal
platform to raise money without triggering the same SEC regu88
lation, often referred to as the “equity model” of crowdfunding.
The purpose of Title III is to “help alleviate the funding gap
and accompanying regulatory concerns faced by startups and
89
small businesses in connection with raising capital.” Title III
makes equity crowdfunding accessible to both small companies
and investors, as it allows qualifying companies to utilize
crowdfunding to sell securities without the standard SEC regulations.
Specifically, Title III adds Securities Act section 4(a)(6),
which creates an exemption from SEC registration under the
90
Securities Act of 1933. Under section 4(a)(6), if a company
meets three main requirements, it may participate in equity
91
crowdfunding. First, the company cannot raise over one mil92
lion dollars over a twelve-month period. Second, individual in93
vestments within this time frame are limited. Third, the investor transactions must be conducted through a registered
intermediary, either a broker or a “funding portal,” a newly es94
tablished entity under the SEC legislation. A company may
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Small Business and the SEC, supra note 82 (explaining the difficulties
and burdens associated with registering a company with the Securities and
Exchange Commission).
88. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,429.
89. Id. at 66,430.
90. Id. at 66,431.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 66,431–32.
93. The investment cannot come from an investor in an amount greater
than $2,000 or 5% of the annual income or net worth if the investor has less
than $100,000 in annual income or net worth; alternatively, if the investor has
an annual income or net worth of over $100,000, the investor is limited to investing 10% of their annual income or net worth, but not to exceed $100,000.
Id. at 66,433–34.
94. A funding portal is defined by the SEC as an intermediary platform
that does not, amongst other things, “(i) offer investment advice or recommendations; (ii) solicit purchases, sales, or offers to buy securities offered or displayed on its website or portal; . . . (iv) hold, manage, possess, or otherwise
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only use one intermediary to conduct an offering or concurrent
95
offerings.
In addition, Title III creates a number of regulatory requirements for companies that qualify and choose to partake in
equity crowdfunding. Among other provisions, Title III adds
section 4(a) to the Securities Act of 1933, which requires that
“issuers and intermediaries that facilitate transactions between
issuers and investors . . . provide certain information to investors and potential investors, take certain other actions and pro96
vide notices and other information to the [SEC].” To protect
97
investors, section 4(a)(6) requires issuer disclosures. These
disclosures are required at the time of offering, on an ongoing
basis with the SEC, and must be displayed on the intermediary
98
platform. Registered intermediaries will also be required to
provide communication channels to facilitate the sharing of in99
formation between the company and any potential investors.
Generally, “an issuer offering or selling securities in reliance on
section 4(a)(6) must file specified disclosures, including financial disclosures, with the [SEC], provide these disclosures to investors and the relevant broker or funding portal and make
100
these disclosures available to potential investors.” These disclosures include basic information, such as the name, legal status, and website of the issuer; information regarding the directors, officers, and majority shareholders; basic business and
financial information; and basic information regarding the of101
fering. Furthermore, there are ongoing disclosure requirements, which require an annual filing “with the [SEC] and
provid[ing] to investors reports of the results of operations and
102
financial statements of the issuer.”
The new equity crowdfunding platform will undoubtedly
help small businesses, including benefit corporations. Many arhandle investor funds or securities.” Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act,
Frequently Asked Questions About Crowdfunding Intermediaries, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (May 7, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/
tmjobsact-crowdfundingintermediariesfaq.htm [hereinafter Frequently Asked
Questions]; see also Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,435.
95. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,435.
96. Id. at 66,430
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 66,437–38.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 66,450.
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gue, however, that the disclosures are not enough, and that the
103
Act lacks serious precautions to protect potential investors.
2. The JOBS Act Eliminates Prohibited Solicitation and
Advertising of Private Security Offerings for Certain Small
Businesses
In addition to allowing equity crowdfunding, the SEC has
eliminated the prohibition on soliciting and advertising securi104
ty offerings. Traditionally, companies sell securities if they
are registered with the SEC or if they fall within statutory ex105
emptions from registration. Most exemptions “prohibit companies from engaging in general solicitation or general advertising—that is, advertising in newspapers or on the Internet
106
among other things—in connection with securities offerings.”
As such, if companies sell securities within these registration
exemptions, the company is prohibited from advertising and soliciting potential investors. There are various exemptions from
registration, but “Rule 506 of Regulation D is the most widely107
used,” especially for small companies. Rule 506 creates a
“safe harbor” for companies seeking to solidify their offering as
a private offering, and, therefore, protect themselves from the
108
Although
burdensome SEC public offering requirements.
Rule 506 traditionally required that these exempt companies
refrain from advertising and soliciting their securities, Title II
of the JOBS Act (Title II) provides for general solicitation. Title
II eliminates the traditional prohibition of “general solicitation
or general advertising in offering and selling securities pursuant to Rule 506, provided that all purchasers of the securities
are accredited investors and the issuer takes reasonable steps
109
to verify that such purchasers are accredited investors.” The
SEC specifies that accredited investors are “individuals who
103. See, e.g., Michael D. Guttentag, Protection from What? Investor Protection and The JOBS Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 207 (2013) (explaining the
lack of protection afforded to consumers under the JOBS Act).
104. Fact Sheet, supra note 79.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 1, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule506.htm. Regulation D Rule 506 companies
are required to fill out Form D, which is available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/forms/formd.pdf.
109. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General
Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,771
(July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 242).
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meet certain minimum income or net worth levels, or certain
institutions such as trusts, corporations, or charitable organi110
zations that meet certain minimum asset levels.” Title II is
thereby limited in its availability to small businesses, but is
111
nonetheless a powerful tool to gain more investors and funds.
The Act’s solicitation platform will open a new avenue for
small and startup benefit corporations to advertise, and in turn
gain more investors, but there are numerous issues that may
arise. A primary concern is the minimal disclosure require112
ments. The issuing company has minimal disclosure obligations triggered by Rule 506 at the time of offering; Rule 506
113
does not have ongoing disclosure requirements. Disclosure
requirements are, in essence, replaced with investor accredita114
tion requirements. However, this shift, from the corporation
to the investor, may increase the likeliness of fraudulent practices and create information asymmetry among investors of
benefit corporations; a scenario that has the potential to nega115
tively impact the future of these new entities.
II. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN THE JOBS ACT AND
BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
As previously discussed, the primary issue facing benefit
corporations is the ability to raise and maintain enough funds
116
to support their operations. However, with the enactment of
Title II and III of the JOBS Act, raising funds is more attainable for all small businesses, including most benefit corporations. The JOBS Act aids in alleviating funding problems for
benefit corporations, but it creates serious issues for the investors of benefit corporations: neither the SEC regulations nor
state benefit corporation legislation includes affirmative disclosure requirements educating and informing potential investors.
Part A discusses the ways in which the JOBS Act alleviates
110. Fact Sheet, supra note 79.
111. Chance Barnett, The Crowdfunder’s Guide to General Solicitation and
Title II Of The JOBS Act, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2013, 10:40 AM), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2013/09/23/the-crowdfunders-guide-to-generalsolicitation-title-ii-of-the-jobs-act/3.
112. Brummer & Gorfine, supra note 18 (explaining the major change in
the law and in what circumstances a company can now, under the JOBS Act,
solicit or advertise their securities to investors).
113. See Guttentag, supra note 103, at 247–48.
114. See id. at 249.
115. Id.
116. See supra Part I.
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funding issues for benefit corporations. Part B discusses the
major issues the JOBS Act creates for potential investors,
threatening the success of benefit corporations.
A. THE JOBS ACT SOLVES FUNDING ISSUES FOR BENEFIT
CORPORATIONS
While it is impossible to resolve all financial issues facing
benefit corporations, the JOBS Act largely alleviates many
funding issues that benefit corporations currently face. Benefit
corporations can now utilize the new equity crowdfunding model to raise funds or take advantage of the new solicitation laws
117
to attract additional investors. These new funding platforms
are ideal for benefit corporations for three primary reasons.
First, benefit corporations are generally small, startup busi118
nesses, and the JOBS Act is intended to help such companies.
Second, current, non-equity crowdfunding is targeted at small,
often non-profit, companies with a mission or greater social
119
purpose. While this generally does not need to be explicit in a
company’s mission to participate, this is what has driven, and
120
will continue to drive, the popularity behind crowdfunding.
Due to their mission-based purposes, it is natural that benefit
121
corporations will use these platforms. Benefit corporations
inherently fall within this target mission-focused type of com122
pany. Third, benefit corporations will use solicitation because
it is a simple, relatively easy way to gain investors. Benefit cor117. The JOBS Act does not include any provision excluding certain entity
types.
118. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106,
126 Stat. 306, 307–08 (2012).
119. See, e.g., FIRSTGIVING, http://www.firstgiving.com (last visited Mar. 9,
2015) (exemplifying a non-profit oriented crowdfunding site); KICKSTARTER,
http://www.kickstarter.com (last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (exemplifying a community and arts oriented crowdfunding site). See generally Taylor Corrado, 7 Top
Crowdfunding Sites for Nonprofits and Higher-Ed Institutions, HUBSPOT
(Sept. 9, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://blog.hubspot.com/marketing/crowdfunding
-sites-for-nonprofits-higher
-ed-li.
120. See Victor Luckerson, The Crowdfunding Economy Is About To Pop,
TIME (Sept. 24, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/09/24/the-crowdfunding
-economy-is-about-to-pop.
121. See Strom, supra note 5 (“Unlike a straight nonprofit group, these
businesses can tap into conventional capital markets as well as philanthropy.
And unlike a for-profit corporation, the structure allows investors to emphasize the social mission over making money, and to be supported by money from
foundations.”).
122. Id.
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porations have the potential to be successful using solicitation
because of their profit- and mission-based model, which has already proven attractive to investors and consumers in the in123
creasingly socially-minded market.
Although there are some entry barriers to these platforms,
they are minimal and are no different for benefit corporations
124
than for any other business entity. It follows, then, that benefit corporations will have the opportunity to sell shares in their
company through equity crowdfunding without traditional SEC
registration, thus increasing the company’s ability to attain
125
funding. In addition to solicitation, a simple form of advertising to investors, the equity crowdfunding platform will greatly
increase a company’s exposure, as its information will be available on an intermediary’s website, which potential investors
126
will primarily utilize. As a result, if benefit corporations meet
the SEC requirements, they will be able to advertise shares
and solicit investors. This will greatly increase a benefit corpo127
ration’s exposure to potential investors. Gaining traction with
such investors will ultimately enable the corporation to acquire
128
funds in support of the business. While these platforms cannot fully eliminate funding issues facing small businesses, including those facing benefit corporations, they are an important
and necessary step to level the playing field and access investors.
B. THE JOBS ACT GENERATES INVESTOR PROTECTION ISSUES
FOR BENEFIT CORPORATIONS UTILIZING SOLICITATION AND
CROWDFUNDING UNDER THE JOBS ACT
The funding platforms under the JOBS Act are advantageous for benefit corporations, yet the increased access to investors and the funding they provide creates serious problems in
investor protection. Although affirmative disclosures are a pri129
mary way to protect investors, neither the SEC nor states
123. See id.
124. The statute makes no reference to entity status. See generally
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306, 307–08 (2012).
125. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 94.
126. See Barnett, supra note 111.
127. See Michaels, supra note 80.
128. Id.
129. See Guttentag, supra note 103, at 249; see also Mary Jo White, Chair,
Sec. Exch. Comm’n, National Association of Corporate Directors – Leadership
Conference 2013: The Path Forward on Disclosure (Oct. 15, 2013) (“At the
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have imposed adequate disclosure regulations upon benefit
corporations. These regulations would be a crucial source of information regarding the nature of benefit corporations for potential investors, as they could explicitly provide pertinent in130
vestment information directly to the potential investor. The
potential damage caused by merely a single benefit corporation
that defrauds its investors has the potential to negatively impact the reputation and future success of all benefit corporations.
The SEC’s proposed legislation of equity crowdfunding includes limited disclosures regarding the business operations
131
and financial condition of the company. These disclosures,
however, do not necessitate disclosure detailing the type of
132
business entity. The entity of a company affects the nature of
133
an investment in that company. While many benefit corpora134
tions may advertise their entity-status to their advantage,
there is no provision in either funding platform regulation that
mandates the disclosure of the foundational differences be135
tween a benefit corporation and a traditional corporation. Because there is no affirmative disclosure required, a benefit corporation would not be obligated to identify as such, leaving

SEC, one of the most meaningful powers that we have to wield on behalf of
investors is our authority to require companies to tell investors about the
things that matter to them.”).
130. See generally Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation
and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg.
44,771 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 242) (explaining the disclosures required, which does not include any affirmative disclosures regarding business entity or operations); MODEL BENEFIT CORP.
LEGISLATION § 401(a)(1) (2013).
131. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66430 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249).
132. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and
General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. at
44,771.
133. See generally Anita K. Krug, Escaping Entity-Centrism in Financial
Services Regulation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2039, 2042 (2013) (discussing the
importance of the entity-status in financial regulation).
134. See Reiser, supra note 10, at 621–24; see also Benefit Corporations: A
New Formula for Social Change, CTR. FOR ASS’N LEADERSHIP (June 2012),
http://www.asaecenter.org/Resources/ANowDetail.cfm?ItemNumber=179687
(“There is a strong case to be made for becoming a benefit corporation to gain a
competitive advantage and attract investors, many of whom are specifically
designing portfolios devoted to triple-bottom-line companies.”).
135. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General
Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771.
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potential investors unaware of the difference between a benefit
and traditional corporation and, therefore, unprotected.
Like SEC regulation, state benefit corporation legislation
does not include affirmative disclosures regarding the nature of
136
the business entity. Although state benefit corporation legislation includes efforts to promote transparency of operations,
such efforts focus on minimal initial disclosures to potential investors and then after-the-fact annual disclosures regarding
137
the company’s efforts to attain their purported benefits. These efforts revolve around the annual benefit report, which must
be posted on the company website, and discloses completed ef138
forts done to achieve the company’s purported benefits. While
this regulation is an important step to keep existing shareholders informed about business operations and profits, it is ineffective to inform potential investors about the nature of the specif139
ic business and what a benefit corporation model entails.
State legislation does little in the way of informing investors
about the fundamental nature of a benefit corporation before
reaching shareholder status, ultimately leaving them unaware
140
and unprotected. Though some investors may seek to gain a
better understanding of benefit corporations through independent research, many will remain unaware of the nature of their
investment and uninformed as to how benefit corporations dif141
fer from traditional corporations.
Affirmative disclosure regulations are one of the strongest
tools available to protect both sophisticated and unsophisticat-

136. See generally MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 401(a)(1) (2013)
(exemplifying the typical disclosures required of benefit corporations, which
does not include explanation of the type of entity).
137. See id.; CAL. CORP. CODE § 14630 (West 2014); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 420D-11 (2013); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-08 (LexisNexis
2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11 (West 2013); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1708
(McKinney 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14 (2014); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-788 (2011).
138. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 401(a)(1); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 14630; HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-11; MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C08; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11; N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1708; VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11A, § 21.14; Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-788.
139. See, e.g., MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 401(a)(1) (exemplifying the traditional disclosures, which do not target investors).
140. See generally id. § 401(a)(1).
141. See Anne Field, Benefit Corporations, L3Cs and All the Rest: Making
Sense of Those Confusing Choices, FORBES (May 25, 2012, 9:58 AM) http://
www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2012/05/25/benefit-corporations-l3cs-and-all
-the-rest-making-sense-of-those-confusing-choices/2.
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142

ed benefit corporation investors. The nature of an entity af143
fects the nature of the underlying investment. Since most investors will not understand the major differences in the operations, obligations, and largely untested shareholder rights of
benefit corporations, information regarding the fundamental
144
business nature of these corporations is important. Without
further affirmative disclosure regulations, investor protection is
compromised in three ways. First, without mandatory disclosures regarding fundamental business information, many in145
vestors will be put at an informational disadvantage. Second,
without affirmative disclosures, there is a greater opportunity
to employ fraud and deception in an attempt to attract inves146
tors. Third, investors often need to be protected from “their
own unwise investment decisions,” as investors may be attracted by the brand of an investment, such as a benefit corporation,
without weighing the value it will bring them as a sharehold147
er.
1. Without Adequate Affirmative Disclosure Requirements,
Investors Will Be Ill-Informed About the Nature of Investments
in a Benefit Corporation
Without affirmative disclosures, equity crowdfunding and
solicitation will create a major informational gap between the
individual investors, as well as between investors and benefit
corporations. Thus, many investors will be left undereducated
and ill-informed about the nature of benefit corporations when
investing in such entities through these platforms. Such informational asymmetry can significantly harm investors and the
148
market.
Under the current JOBS Act, benefit corporations have no
responsibility to educate or inform investors regarding the nature of their business entity. The JOBS Act focuses primarily

142. See Guttentag, supra note 103, at 249.
143. See generally Krug, supra note 133, at 2042 (discussing the importance of the entity-status in financial regulation).
144. Id.; see Bend & King, supra note 73.
145. See Guttentag, supra note 103, at 249.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 252.
148. See id. at 249 n.226 (“The goal of protecting investors from information asymmetry is more of a means than an end. The concern for investors
is not that they will have less information per se, but that various untoward
results may follow when investors have less information.”).
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149

on for-profit seeking investors. This is advantageous for benefit corporations, but dangerous for investors. Benefit corporations often lose investors who seek either a maximized profit,
therefore investing in a for-profit entity, or those who seek a
150
non-profit venture to fulfill their mission-based interests. The
JOBS Act funding platforms are aimed at individuals seeking
151
to invest in a profit-based entity. Therefore, the solicitation
and equity crowdfunding platforms will attract individuals
looking to gain equity in a company to earn a return on their
investment. Benefit corporations, however, are not required to
focus on maximizing profits and shareholder value, and investors may not understand this fundamental difference in their
investment. For benefit corporations utilizing these funding
platforms, the fundamental challenge of gaining investors who
either want for-profit or non-profit investments will be eliminated. Rather than educating investors to solve the for-profit
versus non-profit investment issue, the lack of disclosure creates a gap in information. In turn, the investor may be left unaware of the difference in their investment options, and may
invest in a benefit corporation without realizing the true nature
of such an investment.
Furthermore, the lack of investor education is compounded
in light of the newness of benefit corporations. Benefit corporations only began emerging in 2010, and are recognized in fewer
152
than half of the states. Without affirmative disclosures, there
are few ways in which investors could learn about these new
entities. Even sophisticated investors may not understand that
the term triggers an entirely different entity than that of a traditional corporation, with different and largely untested obliga153
This informational asymmetry can
tions to shareholders.
harm investors and markets due to unexpected and improper
154
investor behavior.

149. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,429 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249) (“Title III was designed to
help alleviate the funding gap and accompanying regulatory concerns faced by
startups and small businesses in connection with raising capital in relatively
low dollar amounts.”).
150. See supra Part I.C.
151. See supra Part I.D.
152. See State by State Legislative Status, supra note 28.
153. Bend & King, supra note 73; Laws Provide Con Artists with Personal
Economic Growth Plan, supra note 12.
154. See Guttentag, supra note 103, at 249 n.226.
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2. Lack of Information Without Affirmative Disclosures
Creates Perverse Incentives for Benefit Corporations To
Defraud and Take Advantage of Investors To Maximize Profit
The difference between traditional and benefit corporations
has a major influence on how a company can gain investors.
Traditionally, for-profit entities focus primarily on maximizing
155
profit and thereby shareholder value. Under the traditional
corporate entity, directors can face shareholder litigation if the
corporation fails to serve its shareholders and instead works
156
Therefore,
solely towards achieving mission-based goals.
shareholders implicitly incentivize traditional corporations to
focus primarily on profits, which is advantageous for both the
company and shareholders. As such, purchasing equity in traditional corporations is a relatively normalized practice. Even
though, depending on the state, shareholder litigation can differ in scope, the benefit corporation is aimed at refocusing corporations on more than profits, expanding the focus to include
157
mission-based goals.
Equity in benefit corporations is a very different investment than that of a traditional corporation. Benefit corporations have different operational obligations, which affect the
158
value of their equity. Further, benefit corporations have the
ability to institutionalize the company’s mission, which endures
159
through director, officer, and ownership succession. As discussed, benefit corporation legislation requires directors and
officers to take actions that support that benefit corporation’s
160
purported public and specific benefits. This obligation can be
prioritized above profits, essentially allowing companies to sec161
ondarily consider profits and shareholder value. While this
may attract some investors, a benefit corporation’s commitment
to a social mission should not attract investors unless the investor is fully aware of the unique nature of the business and
investment and how that will affect the value of their investment.

155. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301 cmt. (2013).
156. Id.
157. See Cyr & Lubar, supra note 6.
158. See Reiser, supra note 10, at 621–24 (explaining the branding benefits
of benefit corporations).
159. See id.
160. Supra Part I.B.2.
161. Supra Part I.B.2.
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If investors are unaware of these fundamental differences
between a regular corporation and a benefit corporation, the
162
potential for fraud increases. Directors and officers of benefit
corporations may be more likely to conceal the true nature of
163
their business without mandatory affirmative disclosures.
164
The lack of disclosures may result in fraud or misinformation.
Moreover, benefit corporations that do not go so far as to commit fraud may still use the benefit corporation “brand” to purport their mission, while utilizing equity crowdfunding and so165
licitation merely to maximize profit. Because the entity is
relatively new, benefit corporations may easily push their mission to attract investors, but fail to mention how this may affect
a potential investors status as a shareholder. This issue compounds the already existing potential for fraud under the JOBS
166
Act, thereby misleading investors. Such an increased likelihood of fraud and misinformation has the potential to damage
the future of benefit corporations. There is concern that it
would be burdensome on the company to make the disclosures
on their own, and, further, that it could potentially steer inves167
tors in another direction if they had full information. As the
regulations stand, however, benefit corporations can conceal
their nature as a benefit corporation when attracting investors,
and instead appear as a “regular” corporation, leaving investors
vulnerable.
3. If Investors Do Not Understand the Nature of the Benefit
Corporation, Investors May Not Understand Their Rights and
Value As Shareholders
The nature of a benefit corporation differs greatly from a
168
regular corporation. Therefore, shareholders have different
162. See Guttentag, supra note 103, at 248.
163. See id. (emphasizing the “fraud-deterring benefits of mandatory disclosure requirements generally,” noting that “disclosure requirements reduce
fraud” and it is therefore “reasonable to mandate at least some basic disclosure requirements”).
164. Id.
165. Cummings, supra note 14, at 589–91.
166. Many argue that fraud may occur under the new crowdfunding platforms, due to both their newness and decidedly less stringent reporting requirements and regulation; the SEC urges that this will be mitigated by the
intermediaries and investor participation. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg.
66,428, 66438 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239,
240, 249).
167. Id.
168. See supra Part I.B.
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rights and value. Without adequate affirmative disclosures, potential investors will likely be unaware of this difference.
Investors often become shareholders in a small company
with the understanding that, if the company is successful, they
will see a monetary return, be it through dividends or an in169
creased return on their investment upon selling the shares.
However, neither of these benefits is guaranteed from a suc170
cessful benefit corporation. Benefit corporations balance their
success differently, focusing on values that the company has institutionalized as equally or more important than profit and
171
shareholder value maximization. While this is essentially the
point of benefit corporations, investors should not participate in
funding these ventures unless they are fully aware of the value
of the equity in which they are investing. Unfortunately, the
lack of disclosure regulations leave investors vulnerable to this
misinformation.
Furthermore, shareholders tend to invest with the under172
standing that they can hold management accountable. Bene173
fit corporations, however, are entirely untested in litigation.
Although some state legislation includes a shareholder right to
action if the directors are not promoting the corporation’s purported public or specific benefits, this is not a uniform provision
174
found in all states. Therefore, without full information, investors are subject to a new and untested realm of common law,
and may be investing in a company without the ability to pro175
tect their rights to, and value in, the business.
With fully disclosed information regarding shareholder
value and rights, these issues would be largely eliminated.
169. Capital One, What Is a Stock and Why Buy Stocks?, SHAREBUILDER
KNOWLEDGE CTR. (2013) http://content.sharebuilder.com/mgdcon/knowledge
center/Trade/stocks/what_is_a_stock/what-is-a-stock.htm# (explaining that
investors buy equity in companies in order to earn a profit, either from the
payout of dividends to shareholders or in the trading of their stocks in a favorable market).
170. See Benefit Corporations: A New Formula for Social Change, supra
note 134.
171. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 303(a) (2013); Steven J.
Haymore, Note, Public(ly Oriented) Companies: B Corporations and the Delaware Stakeholder Provision Dilemma, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1311, 1338 (2011) (explaining the unique shareholder value of benefit corporations).
172. See Haymore, supra note 171, at 1338.
173. See Reiser, supra note 10, at 606.
174. See, e.g., 2013 DEL. LAWS CH. 122 (S.B. 47) (2013).
175. See generally Benefit Corporations: A New Formula for Social Change,
supra note 134.
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Again, the difference between a traditional corporation and a
benefit corporation may be attractive to investors, but this difference should not include the capacity to attract investors unless they understand the true nature of a benefit corporation. If
investors knew the true nature of a benefit corporation, they
may better consider their investment, as the rights and benefits of being a shareholder in a benefit corporation are uncer176
tain and untested. Without affirmative disclosure requirements, potential investors may be misled, and focus solely on a
company’s social mission without realizing this social mission
could compromise the investor’s potential profit.
Furthermore, the affirmative disclosure requirements
177
could be advantageous for benefit corporations. Though an
untested business entity, investors are still interested in benefit corporations. The return on investment is not clear, but
many are drawn to the mix of profit- and non-profit based
goals. Some argue that benefit corporations, in “doing things
the right way,” will be “profitable . . . in the long run, because
regulatory shortcuts, product quality compromises, and the like
tend to get discovered and result in corporate failures and un178
derperformance.”
III. THE SEC SHOULD ENACT LEGISLATION THAT
REQUIRES STRONGER AFFIRMATIVE DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS FOR BENEFIT CORPORATIONS THAT
CHOOSE TO UTILIZE THE JOBS ACT FUNDING
PLATFORMS
Additional regulation is necessary to encourage benefit
corporation disclosure in order to inform and protect investors.
Such changes should be introduced promptly so as to prevent
rather than react to damage to investors and the reputation of
benefit corporations in the market. Part A of this section explains why effective regulation must come from the SEC, as the
JOBS Act is on a national scale. Part B suggests initial and ongoing disclosure requirements for companies that take part in
equity crowdfunding. Finally, Part C suggests that there
should be similar disclosures included in any solicitation for in176. Haymore, supra note 171, at 1338 (explaining that there are vast differences in the goals of traditional investors and socially minded investors
that seek to invest in socially conscious companies such as benefit corporations).
177. See Strine, supra note 49, at 251.
178. Id.
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vestors. If affirmative disclosure requirements are not enacted
in either equity crowdfunding or solicitation, the success and
feasibility of benefit corporations could be in danger.
A. ENHANCED SEC DISCLOSURE REGULATIONS ARE MORE
APPROPRIATE AND WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN STATE
REGULATION
SEC regulation would be the best way to create further affirmative disclosure requirements for benefit corporations utilizing the new advertising and equity crowdfunding platforms.
There are three reasons that federal SEC efforts would be more
effective than state efforts. First, such regulation would create
a consistent disclosure requirement for all benefit corporations.
Despite the fact that each state has different legislation, it is
important to impose consistent disclosure requirements for all
benefit corporations; this will protect investors equally
throughout the United States. Second, SEC regulations would
be more efficient than state legislation. A single legislative effort would be far more effective than attempting to amend existing state benefit corporation legislation and to force states to
include such provisions in future legislation. Third, SEC regulation would be more consistent with the already existing disclosure regulations of the JOBS Act than with state disclosures,
and therefore more effective. Although advertising and solicita179
tion regulation includes minimal, informational disclosures,
further disclosure requirements would be consistent with gen180
eral federal security regulation, and would be cohesive with
the equity crowdfunding regulation. SEC regulation is especially attainable for equity crowdfunding because the format of the
181
SEC disclosures is flexible.
Nevertheless, because each state has unique legislation, efforts at the state level could be effectively used to address the
different variations of benefit corporations. Furthermore, federal efforts may be perceived as overzealous because benefit
179. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and
General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771
(July 24, 2013) (explaining the disclosures required, which does not include
any affirmative disclosures regarding business entity or operations).
180. See Guttentag, supra note 103, at 249.
181. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,438 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249) (“[The SEC] recognize[s]
that there are numerous ways to achieve [the goal of material disclosures]
and, as such, [the SEC is] not proposing to mandate a specific disclosure format.”).
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corporation legislation has not been enacted in every state.
Ultimately, while such state-level regulation may be effective,
it would be more advantageous if disclosure requirements were
instituted by the SEC, thereby making them streamlined and
cohesive across the states. A federal disclosure requirement is
especially effective in light of the fact that the new JOBS funding platforms are nationally available and primarily regulated
183
by the SEC.
B. PROPOSED LEGISLATION SHOULD REQUIRE DISCLOSURES
BOTH AT THE TIME OF OFFERING AND ONGOING FOR BENEFIT
CORPORATIONS UTILIZING EQUITY CROWDFUNDING
Benefit corporations participating in the equity
crowdfunding platform established under the JOBS Act should
have additional disclosure requirements. Such disclosures
should be mandated at both the time of offering and on an ongoing basis.
1. Initial Disclosure Requirements
Equity crowdfunding legislation should be amended to
mandate affirmative disclosures at the time of offering regarding the benefit corporation entity structure. Requiring time-ofoffering disclosures is important in order to inform potential
investors about the investment from the outset.
This recommendation can feasibly be incorporated into existing SEC proposed regulation. The SEC has included in their
regulation that the “[SEC] may require additional disclosures
184
for the protection of investors and in the public interest.” The
SEC is also considering including a disclosure requirement of
“a discussion of the material factors that make an investment
185
in the issuer speculative or risky.” Considering these SEC
proposals, it is reasonable that it is in the best interest of the
public to mandate affirmative disclosures for benefit corporations—their status as such is material to the business, and
could increase the perceived risk to investors and lower the
overall returns on their investment.

182. See Strom, supra note 5.
183. Although companies need to adhere to both state and SEC regulations, the SEC’s regulations are generally stronger and more inclusive. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 94.
184. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,438.
185. Id. at 66,442.
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The disclosures at the time of offering should include four
elements. First, the disclosure should include a brief informational statement regarding the nature of a benefit corporation.
This could be a boilerplate statement included to generally in186
form investors of the nature of a benefit corporation. Such a
statement may produce difficulties, however, because each
state has instituted a unique benefit corporation, making it difficult to mandate each state to produce a boilerplate informational disclosure. To entice states to adopt their own boilerplate
based on the state-specific legislation, it would be advantageous
of the SEC to create an example boilerplate statement to serve
as a model.
Second, the legislation should mandate that benefit corporations identify themselves as a benefit corporation, and disclose the benefits, either public or specific, that the company
purports to support. This will inform customers of the missionbased side of the benefit corporation.
Third, the time of offering disclosure should include an explanation of that state’s specific benefit corporation legislation,
including the unique transparency, accountability, and shareholder action provisions that may or may not be required in the
state. Because each state is different, it would be crucial to
make the differences clear to investors to maximize investor
education.
Fourth, the disclosure at the time of offering should include
as an attachment the company’s most recent benefit report.
This will give investors an idea of the company’s operational
commitment to their purported benefit. An issue arises, however, when new benefit corporations, who have not yet made a
benefit report, utilize equity crowdfunding. To address this
problem, the affirmative disclosures should incorporate a provision requiring new benefit corporations to produce a benefit report including all applicable information available at the time
of offering.
Benefit corporations and their proponents may oppose any
additional disclosure requirements implemented by the SEC.
The current disclosure requirements included in the JOBS Act
187
have been decried as too burdensome on small companies.
186. This identification may need to include both a broad and specific description, including what a benefit corporation is, generally, and any differentiating factors of the state they are incorporated in.
187. See, e.g., Andrew A. Schwarz, Keep It Light, Chairman White: SEC
Rulemaking Under the CROWDFUND Act, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 43, 46
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There are also concerns that current disclosures are simply too
188
costly and onerous for small businesses. In light of these
complaints, the SEC may be hesitant to impose further disclosures. However, the proposed disclosures for benefit corporations would be minimal. These disclosures would include either
already existing information regarding the company, or would
be standard informational statements regarding the nature of
the entity. Though the disclosures would require additional
work on the part of benefit corporations, they are worthwhile
and important to the success of the business entity as a whole.
They would notify potential investors of the nature of the investment, allowing investors to more clearly understand an investment before becoming a shareholder. In addition, they
would force companies to be upfront about their status as a
benefit corporation, limit the potential for fraud, and educate
potential investors.
2. Ongoing Disclosure Requirements
The second element of regulation that should be imposed to
protect investors is an ongoing disclosure requirement. Currently, ongoing disclosure requirements under the JOBS Act
mandate “reports of the results of operations and financial
statements of the issuer, as the [SEC] shall, by rule, determine
appropriate, subject to such exceptions and termination dates
189
as the [SEC] may establish, by rule.” The SEC should, therefore, mandate that benefit corporations include their annual
benefit reports with the otherwise required ongoing disclosures.
This additional disclosure would have little to no impact on
benefit corporations, as they are already required to provide
190
benefit reports under state benefit corporation legislation. In
light of the relative ease of implementation, the SEC should also mandate that benefit corporations submit these reports prior
to investment to enhance investor education and communication, and to establish further accountability in benefit corporations utilizing equity crowdfunding.
Again, many benefit corporations may argue that additional disclosures are unduly burdensome. Nevertheless, because
(2013) (attached to open letter for comment to SEC Chairman White, available
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-240.pdf).
188. See id.
189. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66450.
190. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-08 (LexisNexis
2014).
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these reports are already required by state legislation, the SEC
should also require these reports be made available directly to
investors on an ongoing basis.
C. THE SEC SHOULD REQUIRE BENEFIT CORPORATIONS TO
INCLUDE A DISCLOSURE REGARDING THEIR ENTITY STATUS IF
THE BENEFIT CORPORATION UTILIZES THE NEWLY AVAILABLE
ADVERTISING AND SOLICITING OPTIONS UNDER THE JOBS ACT
Since benefit corporations are eligible and can choose to
advertise and solicit investors, the SEC should mandate that
the benefit corporations disclose their status in the communication to potential investors. Currently, there are no affirmative
disclosure requirements for any company utilizing the newly
191
available platforms for advertising and solicitation. The SEC
should set minimum disclosure requirements regarding the nature of the benefit corporation on these solicitations. Generally,
these disclosures should include three fundamental elements.
First, the legislation should require self-identification as a benefit corporation. Second, information regarding the nature of a
benefit corporation should be included. Third, the solicitation
communication should direct potential investors to the company website, where they can find the benefit report for more information regarding the nature of the business.
Although these proposed disclosures are not as comprehensive as those proposed for benefit corporations utilizing equity
crowdfunding, the advertising and solicitation platform for
benefit corporations poses fewer risks for investors. This is because solicitation occurs before the transaction between the investor and the benefit corporation occurs. Additionally, the
mandated sophistication of the targeted investor under this
192
funding platform adds a level of protection for the investor.
Again, the SEC may be hesitant to require additional disclosures, but the fraud deterring values of such disclosures far
outweigh the minimal effort necessary to inform potential investors about the fundamental difference between a benefit
corporation and a traditional corporation.

191. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and
General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg.
44,771, 44,771 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 242)
(explaining the currently required disclosures, which do not include affirmative disclosures regarding business entity or operations).
192. See Guttentag, supra note 103, at 249.
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Ultimately, these affirmative disclosure regulations would
prove extremely beneficial to protect those seeking to invest in
benefit corporations through JOBS Act funding platforms. Rather than react to issues of fraud and misinformation, these
regulatory measures suggest a unique way to prevent them.
Such measures are crucial to secure a successful future for benefit corporations and investors as they seek to utilize these new
funding platforms.
CONCLUSION
Benefit corporations are a new type of business entity that
continues to increase in both number and popularity for small
businesses and entrepreneurs. This growth will be facilitated
through the equity crowdfunding and solicitation platforms
available to small and startup business under the JOBS Act.
However, without affirmative disclosure requirements, those
investors utilizing JOBS Act funding platforms could be at a
serious risk if they unknowingly invest in a benefit corporation
believing it to be a traditional corporation. Both state benefit
corporation legislation and the SEC’s regulation under the
JOBS Act lack necessary investor protection measures. Thus,
benefit corporations, which are largely untested and are already under critical scrutiny, could have their reputation and
popularity seriously undermined if issues arise in their utilization of JOBS Act funding platforms. Without precautions to
protect and educate investors, the success of benefit corporations could be considerably hindered. Although the current
regulations lack necessary affirmative disclosures to protect
uninformed investors who may be attracted to benefit corporations, with greater regulatory safeguards in place, the JOBS
Act has the potential to facilitate the growth and success of
benefit corporations. Such safeguards would be far more effective as a preventative rather than reactive measure. Implementing simple affirmative disclosure regulations would protect the future of benefit corporations and the investors seeking
to make a return on their investment while promoting these
mission-based companies.

